The aim of this study is to present the influence that Marx’s philosophy of praxis had on the formation and consolidation of Henry’s phenomenology of subjective praxis. From Marx’s philosophical work, Henry emphasizes the primacy of the practical over the theoretical. This is a theme that he had been developing in his works, but a new perspective opens up with Marx. He shows that work is carried out by a living subjectivity, therefore, subjectivity performs the action and is carried out (...) in it, and thus culture is born. The study presents the connection between praxis, life and culture and from this is born a phenomenology that aims to enable the self-realization of each individual. (shrink)

O objetivo desse estudo é apresentar a arte como ferramenta para superação da violência a partir da fenomenologia da vida. Michel Henry mostra que a vida é Energia que se impõe como uma verdadeira força e se revela a si mesma. No entanto, nos perguntamos: Por que então existe a barbárie e a violência? Por que a violência se impõe com tanta força em todos os lugares e inclusive no ambiente escolar? Sustentaremos a tese de que a vida tem seus (...) poderes, mas ela precisa se manifestar como na arte, caso contrário, cairemos no obscurantismo. Por isso, iremos considerar que o caminho que nos leva para a manifestação da vida e a superação da violência só pode ser conduzido através da educação. (shrink)

The objective of this study is to make a proposition about our relationship with the environment, with the earth and the cosmos. The central argument of this study is based on Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life, which proposes an affective relationship with nature. This argument opposes the scientific technical conception that, according to Husserl, forgot the world of life, of sensibility. Henry takes up Husserl’s arguments, however, he presents others such as co-appropriation and shows that our relationship is rooted affectively (...) with the land and not in possession. The phenomenology of life points to a change in our attitudes, especially in our way of relating to the environment. It requires a real ‘leap’, a reversal of our thoughts, beliefs, habits, customs and actions. This is because technological development invites and instigates us to ‘explore’ the earth and forgets that it is an absolute otherness and that it needs to be loved and respected by everyone in its depth. (shrink)

Several Indian religious traditions associated with Vedānta offer conflicting descriptions of ultimate reality, Brahman. A prominent example is found in the Bhedābheda Vedānta tradition, which posits that Brahman is both different (bheda) and non-different (abheda) from the world and individual selves. At first glance, this seems like a contradictory statement. However, most Bhedābheda Vedānta thinkers attempt to reconcile the contradiction, asserting, for example, that Brahman is different from the world and individual selves in one sense, yet non-different in another, distinct (...) sense of “difference.” A notable exception seems to be Jīva Gosvāmī (16th Century), a leading theologian of the Caitanya (15th-16th Century) Vaiṣṇava school. According to a widely accepted interpretation, Jīva accepts the contradiction directly, adding that it is inconceivable (acintya). He coined the term that names his school: Acintya Bhedābheda. Despite textual evidence supporting this view, other evidence from Jīva’s writings and subsequent commentaries suggests his theology might be reconstructed using the more traditional contradiction-avoiding approach. This raises some interesting theological issues. The purpose of this paper is to offer an integrated interpretation of Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta, one that synthesizes both interpretations while staying true to the key elements of his ontology. This will be based on a version of Graham Priest’s Logic of Paradox (LP), which I refer to as (a) Logic of Partial Truth (LPT). The result is a paraconsistent and glut-theoretic approach to Jīva’s Bhedābheda Vedānta theology. (shrink)

When faced with the charge that a given concept of God is contradictory, the standard move among philosophers and theologians has been to try to explain away the contradiction and show that the concept of God in question is consistent. This has to do, of course, with the Law of Non-Contradiction (LNC). Another option, which has recently generated interest among logicians and analytic philosophers of religion, is to reject such a move as unnecessary and defend what might be called the (...) contradictory God thesis. To be sure, something close to that can be found in philosophers such as Pseudo-Dionysius, Thomas Aquinas and Nicolaus de Cusa. However, it is only recently that this approach has gained momentum, certainly driven by the contemporary advance of dialetheism and glut theoretic approaches in general, and paraconsistent logic. Needless to say, a standard move among defenders of the contradictory God thesis is to challenge the LNC. The argumentation, however, is seldomly framed in conceptual terms. Instead, it is mostly framed in ontological terms, as God being a contradictory entity. From this perspective, the contradictory God thesis is the thesis that God is a contradictory object. My goal in this paper is to provide a conceptual assessment of the discussion surrounding the contradictory God thesis. To achieve this, I make use of a general and hopefully non-controversial meta-theory of concepts and adopt a semantic approach rather than a metaphysical one. Within this framework, I address the following questions: What are the different ways we can understand the contradictory God thesis? What grounds are there for rejecting a contradictory concept of God? What standard moves are available to defend oneself from such criticisms and how do they relate to the LNC? What challenges do they present? As a secondary goal, the paper introduces a novel defense of the contradictory God thesis, drawing on a specific interpretation of the theology of the 16th-century Indian thinker Jīva Gosvāmī, which avoids the need to challenge the LNC. I term this approach ‘non-dialetheic mystical contradictory theism.’. (shrink)

My purpose in this paper is to clarify or explicate the concept of theodicy. More specifically, I shall provide an account of the concept that takes its logical aspects seriously into consideration as well as satisfies the basic intuitions philosophers of religions have had about it. This shall be done by systematically analysing the several theodical conditions found in the literature. As it shall be seen, these conditions are logically related to one another; collectively, they point not to one, but (...) to several concepts of theodicy. Thus, as by-product of this explicatory endeavour, I shall provide a logically guided, I may say, analysis of such conditions as well as a systematization of the theodical concepts arising from them. I shall follow what might be termed a semiformal approach; despite not developing a full logical theory, I use the standard notation and some important results from the field of formal logic. (shrink)

Panentheism has seen a revival over the past two decades in the philosophical literature. This has partially triggered an interest in Indian models of God, which have traditionally been seen as panentheistic. On the other hand, panentheism has been often associated with panpsychism, an old ontological view that sees consciousness as fundamental and ubiquitous in the natural world and which has also enjoyed a renaissance in recent decades. Depending on where one places fundamentality (whether on the microlevel or on the (...) cosmic-level) there will be two types of panpsychism: micropsychism and cosmopsychism. Despite the apparently rich connection between Indian traditions and panpsychism, especially in its cosmopsychist version, recent work within cross-cultural analytic philosophy of mind seems to be mostly focused on atheistic traditions, such as Advaita Vedānta and Buddhism. My goal in this paper is to contribute to the cross-cultural debate over panentheism and Indian models of God, as well as to the debate on the connections between panpsychism, cosmopsychism and Indian traditions, by examining one of the most important and often quoted texts in Indian religious and philosophical traditions: the theistic Bhavagad Gītā. From a more specific standpoint, the paper has a threefold goal: to offer a panentheistic reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God, to show how this panentheistic model of God entails a form of theistic cosmopsychism, and to locate the Gītā’s cosmopsychism within a broader map of cosmopsychist views. Based on this reconstructive analysis of the Gītā’s cosmopsychism, I also outline some few reflections on the philosophical prospects of theistic cosmopsychism. (shrink)

La finalidad de este trabajo es mostrar las similitudes entre el proceder matemático, concretamente en la geometría, y la metodología desarrollada por Vico en la Scienza nuova ; pues, aunque los objetos de estudios sean distintos , los procedimientos para formar el objeto cognitivo son paralelos.The aim of this work is to show the similarities between mathematical method, concretely geometry, and Vico's methodology developed in the New Science. Even if the objects of study are so different , procedures to shape (...) the cognitive object are parallels. (shrink)

This paper aims to conduct a conceptual analysis of induction, starting with the issue of inductive ambiguities. We will argue that there are two equally valid approaches to addressing these ambiguities. By examining certain logical aspects of the two concepts of plausibility that emerge from these approaches, we can clarify much of the debate surrounding inductive ambiguities. Key to this analysis is the relationship between these notions of inductive plausibility and the concepts of paraconsistency and paracompleteness. Our exploration is grounded (...) in a paraconsistent and paracomplete modal logic designed to address the fundamental elements of both approaches to induction. To illustrate the controversy and our proposed solution, we focus on a notable example of inductive inconsistencies: the lottery paradox. (shrink)

This article examines the Heideggerian interpretation of intentionality as documented in some university lessons related to Being and Time. In his interpretation, Heidegger determines the phenomenological sense of intentionality as the universal structure of the lived experiences and in terms of the mutual correspondence of intentio and intentum. He also understands the concept of intentum as related to "entity in itself", in the strict phenomenological sense that refers to an "entity in its mode of being intended". Besides, he offers indications (...) wich allow us to understand the connection of the phenomenological concept of intentum with the ontological question about the mode of being of entities and with the origin of the ontological difference. (shrink)

El artículo examina un aspecto relevantede la interpretación heideggeriana deltiempo como temporeidad del Dasein: sudeterminación como horizonte trascendentalde la comprensión del ser en general. Sibien es cierto que Heidegger abandonael proyecto ontológico, diseñado en Sery tiempo, de una interpretación temporariadel sentido del ser, el artículo intentamostrar que, en textos posteriores, mantieney profundiza su concepción de latemporeidad como horizonte trascenden-tal de comprensión. Para ello, ofrece unareconstrucción de la noción de esquemahorizontal de los éxtasis tempóreos, a fin deaclarar en qué sentido el (...) tiempo constituyeel origen ontológico del ser-en-el-mundo como ámbito abierto demanifestación significativa.This article examines a eminent aspect ofthe Heideggerian interpretation of the timeas temporality of Dasein: its determinationas transcendental horizon of the comprehensionofBeingingeneral.InspiteofthefactthatHeidegger abandons the on Beingand Time designed ontological project ofa temporal interpretation of the meaningof Being, the article tries to show that inposterior texts maintains and deepenshis conception of the temporality as tran-scendental horizon of comprehension. Inorder to do so, it offers a reconstruction ofnotion horizontal schema of the temporalEcstases, in order to explain how the timeis the ontological origin of the being-inthe-world as open spacefor the sense apparition. (shrink)

In this paper I present a formalization of the theory of ideal concepts applied to the concept of God. It is done within a version of the Simplest Quantified Modal Logic (SQML) and attempts to solve three meta-problems related to the concept of God: the unicity of extension problem, the homogeneity/heterogeneity problem and the problem of conceptual unity.

Review of: Marino, Stefano, Terzi, Pietro, Kant’s “Critique of Aesthetic Judgment” in the 20 th Century. A Companion to Its Main Interpretations, Berlin/Boston, Walter De Gruyter, 2020, pp. 361, ISBN 978-3-11-059613-7.

O propósito deste livro é preencher a lacuna existente no mercado editorial brasileiro no que diz respeito a obras de cunho acadêmico sobre hinduísmo e filosofia indiana. Essa lacuna se reflete, dentre outras, na inexistência de publicações em português que pretendam ir além do mero aspecto introdutório deste que é um dos maiores clássicos da literatura religiosa indiana e mundial: a Bhagavad-gita; também se reflete na inexistência de literatura especializada sobre as várias tradições indianas que têm a Bhagavad- gita como (...) um de seus textos canônicos. -/- Reunindo professores e pesquisadores do Brasil, Israel, Estados Unidos e Reino Unido, este volume apresenta uma visão acadêmica e acessível da Bhagavad-gita centrada em dois aspectos principais: introdução e contextualização da Gita no que se refere à sua história, estrutura e conceitos-chave, de um lado, e análise detalhada de algumas das noções e temas mais relevantes do texto, de outro. Também proporciona visão geral de uma das tradições da Índia - tanto vedanta como vaishava - que mais sofreram influência da teologia e filosofia da Bhagavad-gita: o vaishnavismo gaudiya de Caitanya (1486-1533). -/- O livro encontra-se estruturado em três grupos, ou partes. A primeira, intitulada "Visão Geral da Bhagavad-gita", é composta de dois capítulos e tem como objetivo introduzir o leitor ao Gita como um todo. A segunda, intitulada "Conceitos e Tópicos-Chave da Bhagavad-gita", contém cinco capítulos, cada um centrado na análise de um conceito ou tópico específico da Gita. A terceira e última parte, intitulada "Hinduísmo e Vaishnavismo", é composta por três capítulos e visa apresentar o vaishnavismo, mais especificamente o vaishnavismo gaudiya, situando-o dentro do contexto mais geral do que hoje se denomina hinduísmo. (shrink)

While the failure of the so-called classical theory of concepts - according to which definitions are the proper way to characterize concepts - is a consensus, metaphysical philosophy of religion still deals with the concept of God in a predominantly definitional way. It thus seems fair to ask: Does this failure imply that a definitional characterization of the concept of God is equally untenable? The first purpose of this paper is to answer this question. I focus on the representational side (...) of the matter. My goal is to analyze the extent to which the most important problems raised against the classical view of concepts affect a definitional-representational approach to the concept of God. The second purpose of the paper is to deepen into these issues, arguing for a pluralistic view of concepts and outlining a hybrid special theory of concepts, called the theory of ideal concepts. The theory is special because it deals with a special sort of concepts that I call ideal concepts; it is hybrid because, in addition to definitions, it uses another structure in the characterization of concepts: ideals. My goal is to argue that when applied to the concept of God and added to a pluralistic view of concepts, this theory can function as a tenable representational theory of the concept of God. (shrink)

In this chapter, Ricardo Silvestre and Alan Herbert offer a reconstruction of the Gītā’s concept of God with a focus on the relationship between God and the world. They try to explain the claim that the Gītā is panentheistic. This is done with the help of some key notions of contemporary metaphysics (such as ontological dependence and fundamentality) along with the Indic notion of prakṛti, considered as a metaphysical primitive denoting the intimate relationship that exists between matter and conscious (...) living beings on the one hand, and God on the other. (shrink)

In this paper I try to answer four basic questions: (1) How the concept of God is to be represented? (2) Are there any logical principles governing it? (3) If so, what kind of logic lies behind them? (4) Can there be a logic of the concept of God? I address them by presenting a formal-logical account to the concept of God. I take it as a methodological desideratum that this should be done within the simplest existing logical formalism. I (...) start with first-order logic (FOL) with identity, and then show that its simplest modal extension (SQML, or the simplest quantified modal logic) is enough for us to formalize a minimally satisfactory theory of the concept of God. I focus exclusively on the monotheistic concept of God. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue on Logic and Religion of the journal Logica Universalis (Springer). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and Religion, by Jean-Yves Beziau and Ricardo Silvestre; Thinking Negation in Early Hinduism and Classical Indian Philosophy, by Purushottama Bilimoria; Karma Theory, Determinism, Fatalism and Freedom of Will, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; From Logic in Islam to Islamic Logic, by Musa Akrami; Leibniz’s Ontological Proof of the Existence of God and the Problem of Impossible Objects, (...) by Wolfgang Lenzen; A Logical Analysis of the Anselm’s Unum Argumentum (from Proslogion), by Jean-Pierre Desclés; Monotonic and Non-monotonic Embeddings of Anselm’s Proof, by Jacob Archambault; Computer-Assisted Analysis of the Anderson–Hájek Ontological Controversy, by C. Benzmüller, L. Weber and B. Woltzenlogel Paleo. (shrink)

SummaryThe history of languages is closely related to the history of other human activities. Ideally, hypotheses that are designed for linguistic questions on independent grounds should help to consolidate theories in other knowledge fields, such as the history of ideas. This paper deals with the first Portuguese translation of Forbonnais's Elémens du commerce, considering it as a lexical corpus. The linguistic analysis aims to contribute to the general knowledge about this text and its translations. Furthermore, a lexical analysis of Portuguese (...) data can also be understood in the broader context of Romance languages. To this end, we analysed three linguistic expressions, perceived to be representative case-studies: identifying circulação as a terminological loan, the terminological use of a common word and the contrast between terms from different languages. Translations are obvious tools for communicating new ideas. Carrying out linguistic analyses of translations can help to document how ideas take shape. Furthermore, translation studies provide linguistic evidence that is essential for the study of terminology from a diachronic and inter-linguistic standpoint. Data provided by translated texts helps to clarify the date when neologisms were first introduced in a given language. It also helps to identify possible sources of words and to decode the meaning behind lexical innovation. This paper is an example of the output of a contrastive lexicographic approach to Forbonnais's text. (shrink)

An investigation of what might be called the logical formalization of the process of theory change due to anomalies is presented. By anomaly, we mean an observed fact falling into the explanatory scope of a theory that does not agree with the theory prevision. A classical approach to restore the explicative power of a theory faced with an anomaly is to propose new, tentative auxiliary hypotheses which, along with part of the old set of auxiliary hypotheses, are able to solve (...) the anomaly. After laying down some conclusions about the structure of such process, we propose a multi-modal and non-monotonic logical framework able to represent some key aspects of this important facet of the dynamics of scientific theories. Due to the necessity of accommodating incompatible tentative hypotheses, this framework incorporates a weak form of paraconsistency. As a case study, we analyze the anomalous behaviour of the planet Uranus that threatened the Newtonian celestial mechanics for more than half a century and gave rise to the discovery of Neptune. (shrink)

This paper introduces the special issue on Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument of the Journal of Applied Logics (College Publications). The issue contains the following articles: Formal Approaches to the Ontological Argument, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Jean-Yves Béziau; A Brief Critical Introduction to the Ontological Argument and its Formalization: Anselm, Gaunilo, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; A Mechanically Assisted Examination of Begging the Question in Anselm’s Ontological Argument, by John Rushby; A Tractarian Resolution (...) to the Ontological Argument, by Erik Thomsen; On Kant’s Hidden Ambivalence Toward Existential Generalization in his Critique of the Ontological Argument, by Giovanni Mion; The Totality of Predicates and the Possibility of the Most Real Being, by Srećko Kovač; An Even More Leibnizian Version of Gödel’s Ontological Argument, by Kordula Świętorzecka and Marcin Łyczak; A Case Study On Computational Hermeneutics: E. J. Lowe’s Modal Ontological Argument, by David Fuenmayor. (shrink)

The so-called theory of karma is one of the distinguishing aspects of Hinduism and other non-Hindu south-Asian traditions. At the same time that the theory can be seen as closely connected with the freedom of will and action that we humans supposedly have, it has many times been said to be determinist and fatalist. The purpose of this paper is to analyze in some deepness the relations that are between the theory of karma on one side and determinism, fatalism and (...) free-will on the other side. In order to do that, I shall use what has been described as the best formal approach we have to indeterminism: branching time theory. More specifically, I shall introduce a branching time semantic framework in which, among other things, statements such as “state of affairs e is a karmic effect of agent a”, “a wills it to be the case that e” and “e is inevitable” could be properly represented. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it aims at introducing the ontological argument through the analysis of five historical developments: Anselm’s argument found in the second chapter of his Proslogion, Gaunilo’s criticism of it, Descartes’ version of the ontological argument found in his Meditations on First Philosophy, Leibniz’s contribution to the debate on the ontological argument and his demonstration of the possibility of God, and Kant’s famous criticisms against the (cartesian) ontological argument. Second, it intends to critically examine (...) the enterprise of formally analyzing philosophical arguments and, as such, contribute in a small degree to the debate on the role of formalization in philosophy. My focus will be mainly on the drawbacks and limitations of such enterprise; as a guideline, I shall refer to a Carnapian, or Carnapian-like theory of argument analysis. (shrink)

La somatización se considera como uno de los más frecuentes y problemáticos fenómenos que encaran los médicos a nivel de atención primaria. Es un término genérico que incluye un amplio rango de fenómenos clínicos, una variedad de procesos que conducen al paciente a buscar ayuda médica por síntom..

This paper introduces the special issue on Logic and Philosophy of Religion of the journal Sophia: International Journal of Philosophy and Traditions (Springer). The issue contains the following articles: Logic and Philosophy of Religion, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre and Jean-Yvez Béziau; The End of Eternity, by Jamie Carlin Watson; The Vagueness of the Muse—The Logic of Peirce’s Humble Argument for the Reality of God, by Cassiano Terra Rodrigues; Misunderstanding the Talk(s) of the Divine: Theodicy in the Wittgensteinian Tradition, by (...) Ondřej Beran; On the Concept of Theodicy, by Ricardo Sousa Silvestre; The Logical Problem of the Trinity and the Strong Theory of Relative Identity, by Daniel Molto; Thomas Aquinas on Logic, Being, and Power, and Contemporary Problems for Divine Omnipotence, by Errin D. Clark. -/- . (shrink)

Meu propósito aqui é jogar alguma luz sobre duas perguntas: “Em que sentido a lógica éfilosófica?” e “O que é lógica filosófica?”. Tomo essas duas questões como sendo coextensivas: umaresposta à uma delas é também (ou pode ser facilmente transformada em) uma resposta à outra.Tentarei trabalhar a partir de três perspectivas: uma perspectiva conceitual, uma descritiva e umaprescritiva. Sendo mais específico, tentarei responder às seguintes perguntas: (i) Em que sentido alógica pode ser tomada como filosófica? (ii) Em que sentido a (...) lógica tem sido tomada como filosófica?(iii) Em que sentido a lógica deve ser tomada como filosófica? Para tanto, analisarei trechos pontuais decinco obras nos quais determinada significação é atribuída a expressão “lógica filosófica”. Asignificações elencadas são então objetos de análise crítica: tento avaliar quais dessas alternativas nãose sustentam como respostas satisfatórias à (iii). O resultado dessa análise é então utilizado como pontode partida para minha própria resposta à questão (iii). (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. First we want to extent a specific paranormal modal logic in such a way as obtain a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic able to formalize the notions of plausibility and certainty. With this logic at hand, and this is our second purpose, we shall use a modified version of Reiter‘s default logic to build a sort of inductive logic of plausibility and certainty able to represent some basic principles of epistemic inductive reasoning, such (...) as a negative autoepistemic principle, an `error-prone feature of induction' principle and a confirmation by enumeration principle. (shrink)

The traditional perspective on emotions, anchored in the Western philosophical tradition, assumes an irretrievable dualism between emotions and reason. Emotions are assumed as forces, which can blind a person’s view and lead them to do terrible things. For this reason, emotions must be put aside during rational deliberation. For common sense, including legal common sense, emotions are dangerous and are unrelated to rational decision-making. Nevertheless, Aristotelian’s perspective on the relationship between emotions, reason and practical deliberation is enlightening. Emotions are not (...) blind forces completely divorced from reason. Aristotle did not develop a complete theory of emotions but recognized a strong covariance between emotions/passions/sentiments and thoughts. This research is based on three theoretical pillars: Aristotle’s perspective on the relationship between reason and emotions drawn on Nicomachean Ethics and Rethoric, the jurisprudencialism, a jurisphilosophical approach elaborated by António Castanheira Neves, and Terry Maroney’s model for judicial emotion regulation. The power of judgement is assumed mainly as a practical task, which involves the excellence of phronesis, virtues and emotions/sentiments/passions. (shrink)

This paper is an effort to realize and explore the connections that exist between nonmonotonic logic and confirmation theory. We pick up one of the most wide-spread nonmonotonic formalisms – default logic – and analyze to what extent and under what adjustments it could work as a logic of induction in the philosophical sense. By making use of this analysis, we extend default logic so as to make it able to minimally perform the task of a logic of induction, having (...) as a result a system which we believe has interesting properties from the standpoint of theory of confirmation. It is for instance able to represent chains of inductive rules as well as to reason paraconsistently on the conclusions obtained from them. We then use this logic to represent some traditional ideas concerning confirmation theory, in particular the ones proposed by Carl Hempel in his classical paper "Studies in the Logic of Confirmation" of 1945 and the ones incorporated in the so-called abductive and hy-pothetico-deductive models. (shrink)

Is it possible to combine different logics into a coherent system with the goal of applying it to specific problems so that it sheds some light on foundational aspects of those logics? These are two of the most basic issues of combining logics. Paranormal modal logic is a combination of paraconsistent logic and modal logic. In this paper, I propose two further combinatory developments, focusing on each one of these two issues. On the foundational side, I combine paranormal modal logic (...) with normal modal logic, resulting into a paraconsistent and paracomplete multimodal logic dealing with the notions of plausibility and certainty. On the application side, I combine this logic with Reiter’s default logic, resulting into an inductive and consequently nonmonotonic paraconsistent and paracomplete logic able to represent some key inductive principles. (shrink)

Sáo dois os propósitos deste artigo. Primeiro desejamos examinar porque o projeto de Carnap de construir uma lógica indutiva náo foi bem sucedido. De forma a realizar isso, nos apoiaremos na distinçáo entre o problema da justificaçáo da induçáo e o problema da descriçáo da induçáo. Tentaremos mostrar que a principal razáo pela qual o projeto de Carnap falhou foi sua relaçáo com o problema da justificaçáo da induçáo. Nosso segundo objetivo é propor algumas idéias de como seria um lógica (...) da induçáo que propositadamente evite o problema da justificaçáo e possa consequentemente ser chamada de uma lógica puramente descritiva da induçáo. Utilizaremos para isso um conceito de probabilidade presente no Logical Foudations of Probability de Carnap chamada por ele de probabilidade pragmática. (shrink)

In this two-part paper we present paranormal modal logic: a modal logic which is both paraconsistent and paracomplete. Besides using a general framework in which a wide range of logics – including normal modal logics, paranormal modal logics and classical logic – can be defined and proving some key theorems about paranormal modal logic (including that it is inferentially equivalent to classical normal modal logic), we also provide a philosophical justification for the view that paranormal modal logic is a formalization (...) of the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility. (shrink)